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home\ n.,a., & adv. OED l.n. Dwelling-place; fixed residence of family or 
household ... 2. Native land of oneself or one's ancestors, esp. Britain (sic). 3. 
Place where thing is native or most common ... come ~ to, become fully 
realised by...
I n April 1994, with the singular, unrepeatable event of the election, South Africa once again has come to occupy a space in the imaginary of the West 
which is both unique and exemplary.1 In a world torn apart by ethno-national- 
ist struggles, in the absence of the stabilising influence of the Cold War, South 
Africa almost effortlessly moved from being a pariah state, to becoming a 
symbol of hope and unity, of what can be achieved in the name of democracy. 
However, reading this event from the standpoint of the spectator alone, will 
not do. For the election not only reaffirmed that which the West desired but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, it instituted a new imaginary, a horizon 
within which for the first time, a fluid, open South African identity became a 
possibility for all those denied it before.
Institution
The election acted as the moment of institution of a new social imaginary, 
signifying a beginning, an origin, as well as a completion. That is to say, the 
delineation of the horizon within which a newly articulated South African 
identity orginated, also prefigures the space of its own fulfilment. What is 
instituted as radically new, serves as an always already given origin, marking 
out the space of the possible. Such is the paradox of all beginnings. However, 
this is not to say, in Hegelian fashion, that such beginnings are determined by 
developments to follow. To the contrary, the element of paradox on which I
1 This argument is elaborated in Norval (1994b). 
Fil. vest. /Acta Phil., XV (2/1994), 27-43.
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want to focus here emphasises the contingency and impurity of all beginnings 
which, while far from determining its forms of identification, cuts out a space 
open to contestation and subversion, at the same time as it sets limits to that 
identification.
In South Africa, the radical institution of a new imaginary happened before our 
very eyes:
The abiding image o f the day that South Africa began to become one nation, 
all together, was in the orange, autumn sun rising over a new country teeming 
with extraordinary, renewed people. It rose over a country with a new flag, a 
new anthem, a new map, and a profound new human mood. When the people 
began to form those lines they became a new people, spontaneously and 
unintentionally. The tiny seed first glimpsed on the national peace day last 
year, giving life to the otherwise lifeless political slogan »non-racial«, burst 
into resplendent flower. Black South Africans learnt what whites already 
knew: how to vote. White South Africans learnt what blacks knew: how to wait. 
They did it together, in marvelous straggly multi-coloured queues... (Johnson, 
1994, emphasis added).
The question remaining to be addressed in this respect is the following: how do 
we think this moment of institution? The most obvious candidate for this in the 
tradition of political theory is, of course, the social contract tradition which 
attempts to theorise the moment of inauguration and establishment of society. 
The paradox we encounter here is well known: in order to institute society, we 
already need to have in place that which can only be brought about as a result 
of the very act of institution. As Connolly ( 1991:465) argues with reference to 
Rousseau, »(f)or a general will to be brought into being, effect (social spirit) 
would have to become cause and cause (good laws) would have become 
effect«. As we know, Rousseau resolved this problem in an interesting fash­
ion. He argued that the legislator being unable to employ either force or 
argument, »must have recourse to an authority of another order«, must claim 
his own contingent wisdom to be that of the Gods (Rousseau, 1968: 87). In 
order to establish the purity of the law, the lawgiver in fact has to resort to the 
impure mechanism of deception. In this sense, Rousseau not only »solves« his 
own problem, but sets into place a radical argument for the »ignobility of all 
origins«, even that of the Law, so introducing an ineliminable element of 
arbitrariness into political life.
This act of institution is always retroactively realised, constituted after the 
fact. Analogously, it could be argued that the real constitution of the South 
African nation took place not so much in the actual act of queueing, as in the 
retrospective viewing of that act, emphasising the moment it entered the gaze, 
making the actor simultaneously spectator of her own acts. And in this very
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moment of elation, of birth, was enacted the contractual paradox: it foreshad­
owed the very thing which would make the nation possible. It established a 
South African identité à venir. It provided a vision of tolerance, of fusion, and 
one might say, of precarious unity, which everyone full well knows is patently 
absent in the present.2 To put it differently, the very conditions of possibility 
for democracy was instituted in a context scarred by their very absence.
Empty spaces, barred subjects
While the act of institution always contains a paradox, this does not mean that 
the paradox is eradicated with the full institution of a democratic social order. 
As I have pointed out earlier, there is an ineliminable element of in the ignoble, 
arbitrary moment of institution which continues to mark the political space. In 
order to understand why this is the case, we need to look more closely at two 
further dimensions of this institution: that of the space itself, and of the subject 
of democracy. Let us start with the former.
»Democratic society could be determined as a society whose institutional 
structures includes, as part o f its »normal«, »regulär« production, the moment 
o f dissolution o f the symbolic bond, the movement o f the irruption o f the Real: 
elections«. (Žižek, 1989:147)
In his seminal work on the democratic imaginary, Lefort argues that in a 
democratic society the place of power is an empty one (1988:17). That is, 
democracy involves the institutionalisation of the markers of uncertainty. 
What is sacrificed here is precisely the possibility of a given and certain 
content filling, without question, the place of power. But with this sacrifice, as 
with all sacrifices, something crucial is gained. The empty space of power, in 
fact, secures in its very nature, the space of contestability. Far from being a 
safe and merely bourgeois phenomenon, democracy shows the radical 
incompletion of all forms of identification.
The third dimension of the paradox of this institution concerns the nature of
2 The extent o f the intolerance characterising the South African political landscape, most 
recently, has been visible in the extreme violence in the PWV-region as well as kwaZulu-Natal. 
Other indicators can be used here as well. For example, a survey of the Western Cape region 
showed that 61% o f  Africans and 45% of Coloureds would not allow a political party they 
oppose to make political speeches on their home turf (Collins, 1994). Shortly before the 
elections, voter education programmes were reportedly being thwarted in kwaZulu-Natal by 
both the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress. Several incidents in the rest 
o f  the country was reported where speakers were violently prohibited from addressing political 
meetings. These more recent indicators should, o f course, not overshadow the fact that the 
political history o f  South Africa as a whole can be described as a severely intolerant one.
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the subject to complement this empty space. We can ask with Žižek, »who is 
the subject of democracy?« The anwer? The subject of abstraction, »the empty 
punctuality we reach after subtracting all the fullness of particular contents« 
(Žižek 1991:190) As both Laclau and Žižek, following Lacan, have argued, 
the important point here is not simply the empty point of reference, the »all 
people without regard to...« which forms the preamble to every democratic 
credo (Žižek 1991:190). Rather, what is crucial is the fact that the non­
substantiality of subjectivity, or to put it in Lacanian terms, the subject of a 
constitutive lack, the barred subject, inauguarates the need for identification.
However, here the further paradox, or perhaps the paradox of democracy 
emerges. For democracy, in order to be democracy at all, has to be anti- 
humanistic in that it has to abstract from specificity. Yet, it also has to 
engender acts of identification which will always threaten the very moment of 
abstraction itself, which will »smear« democracy with particularity (Žižek, 
1991:192). This is the very space in which the recent debate between liberals 
and communitarians is constituted, with liberals focussing exclusively on the 
abstraction of the subject from all context -  exemplified in the Rawlsian »veil 
of ignorace« -  while communitarians, in what had to amount to anti-demo­
cratic gestures, tended to solidify the subject, cementing it for ever in the 
bonds of community. Neither of these options will do, and while it is not 
possible here to discuss the matter in detail, it is necessary to signal oür 
disquiet with these »either-or« options, both of which misrecognises the 
complexity as well as the essential finitude, not only of the subject, but of the 
very space of democracy itself.
Minimal remainders
Instead of seeing this »smearing« of democracy with singularity as a disaster, 
it is necessary to recognise that democracy arises in the very tension of this 
empty space. Or perhaps, it could better be designated as a non-full space, a 
space marked forever with a radical impossibility. The questioning of forms of 
universality by the emerging particularisms of our time should thus not lead to 
a simplistic reassertion of universality as such. It is in the terrain of the tension 
between the emptiness of universalism, and the particularistic smearing of the 
democratic space, that we will be able to renegotiate not only spaces for the 
democratic recognition of particulatiry, but also for the revalorization of quasi- 
transcendental universalisms. We will return to the theoretical nuances of this 
phenomenon. However, in order not to be accused of excessive theoreticism, 
let us address these issues in the concrete-historico setting of the transition we 
are witnessing in South African politics.
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Closures
It is a truism to say that changes in the political imaginary structuring South 
African politics are taking place against the grain of developments in world 
politics. It is almost passé to remark that since 1989, with the end of globalising 
ideologies, we have entered the realm of a vicious proliferation of particularis­
tic forms of identification. In the absence of a single principle of division of 
international frontiers, with the present undermining of universalistic forms of 
thought, the new South Africa appears almost as an anachronism, out of place 
in the contemporary world. But precisely for this reason, South Africa now 
also acts as a crucial signifier in the imaginary of the West. In contrast to its 
earlier pariah status, it now is a site invested with the most extreme of hopes. 
We will explore this dimension further. However, let me first consider the role 
played by 1989 in the South African context, for it is in the precise manner of 
its articulation, that its significance is to be found. It is of course well known 
that the February 2, 1990 FW de Klerk speech, unbanning the ANC, SACP 
and other political organisations, very much took its cue from the series of 
events marked by 1989:
»The year 1989 will be known in history as the year o f the death o f Stalinist 
communism. The effects o f these events for Europe are unpredictable, and they 
will also be o f decisive importance for Africa... The implosion o f the Marxist 
economic system o f Eastern Europe stands as a warning against all those who 
want to persevere with this in Africa.« (Hansard, 2 February 1990, kol.3, my 
translation)
Thus, setting the scene for the reconstruction of South Africa, the creation of a 
»just political order in which every will have equal rights... [and] opportunity« 
(Hansard 2 February 1990, kol.2). It is important that the moment of the death 
of »Stalinism« and »Marxism«, coincides with the death of apartheid.
This, of course, does not come as a surprise. Indeed in the contemporary 
international political context referred to earlier, the end of grand narratives 
inevitably had to mark the project of apartheid. Let we forget, let us reflect for 
a moment on the nature of this project. Elsewhere I have characterised the 
logic of apartheid as an identitary logic, one in which the closure and purity of 
identity took primacy.3 The complicated vicissitudes of this project should not 
be allowed to obscure the centrality and specificity of its logic in the shaping 
of the South African political landscape. I will not dwell on the nature of 
apartheid here. However, it is necessary to reflect briefly on the lingering 
effect this discourse of closure may have on the longer term prospects for a
1 My argument concerning the logic o f apartheid is elaborated in Norval (1994b).
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democratic settlement in South Africa. Three areas of identity formation are 
crucial in this respect. They are, the struggles around Inkatha and the Zulu 
monarchy; the question of coloured identity, and the role of the far-right.4 We 
will focus only on the third: the grouping of forces alligned around the far right 
Afrikaner Volksfront and the Freedom Front under the leadership of General 
Constand Viljoen.5 The reasons for this choice are the following. Literature on 
these groupings is scant and largely journalistic accounts written either by 
sympathisers or scaremongers. Academic accounts are few and far between 
and tend to subscribe to simplistic views of history, locating the re-emergence 
of the radical right in the 1980s and 1990s as a straight-forward continuation of 
a certain tradition of »Afrikaner nationalism«.6
Very little attention has been given to the precise imaginary feeding into the 
constitution of these groupings. It has been all too easy to pigeonhole these 
groupings in a rather simplistic fashion as just one more manifestation of the 
sort of extreme racist discourse which informed segregation as well as apart­
heid discourses, resulting, once again in a left impotence in front of the values 
espoused by these forces. This evaluation may not be entirely out of place. 
Especially the Afrikaner Volksfront makes no effort to conceal their overt 
racist criteria of inclusion and exclusion contained in their conception of the 
»Afrikaner volk«.1 The situation with regard to the Freedom Front, however, is
4 The struggles between Inkatha and the ANC is well documented and analysed in the existing 
literature. This is not the case with reference to the question o f Coloured identity and the far 
right. I have discussed some o f the problems with regard to the former in Norval (1994c).
5 The Freedom Front ( Vryheidsfront) was formed in March 1994 when General Constant Viljoen 
decided to break away from the Afrikaner Volksfront, and to participate in the April elections. 
A considerable amount o f overlap in terms o f  membership affiliation continued to exist 
between the two organisations.
6 See, for example, the recent study by Van Rooyen ( 1994) on the »hard right« where he argues 
that »as the NP expanded its narrow ethnic origins to incorporate a broader white nationalism 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and an even broader territorially based South African nationalism in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was left for the right wing to take up the cause o f Afrikaner 
nationalism« (1994:3). Van Rooyen's account leads him into two difficulties. The first is the 
tendency to assume the existence o f an »Afrikaner ethnicity« , even i f  he tends to emphasize 
its non-homogeneity insofar as it is expressed in Afrikaner nationalism. Drawing on Horowitz 
in this respect, Van Rooyen assumes a highly questionable naturalistic account o f  the 
»psychological tendencies inherent in ethnicity« , such that ethnic conflict should be under­
stood in terms o f the collective drive by ethnic groups to obtain or maintain social status and 
power (1994:201). The second is that, in spite o f  his emphasis on disunity within Afrikaner 
nationalist circles, he ends up affirming a continuist view o f  history which holds to the idea that 
the right can only be explained as a continuation o f  that tradition. Such a simplistic affirmation 
o f continuities is precisely what, I would argue, is questionable if  we are to understand the 
contemporary right in South Africa today.
7 An Afrikaner Volksfront spokesperson, for example, suggested that the issue o f  membership 
o f the volk may easily be decided by applying the »d/jakkals« test (Aucamp, 1994). Should a
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markedly more complicated by the precise articulation and contextualisation 
of the demand for a volkstaat. Here is articulated a second time what seems, at 
first glance, a tragic enactment of apartheid discourse, a yearning for a territo­
rially sovereign state where the »Afrikaner people« can be at home. However, 
it is important not to proceed too quickly here. We need to investigate more 
closely what and whom exactly is designated by the notion of the »Afrikaner 
volk«. In this respect, it is necessary to investigate the functioning of »1989« 
in the discourse of the Freedom Front (FF), and the role it plays in the 
distancing of their discourse from that of traditional apartheid. This distancing 
occurs in the discourses of most of the far right groupings organising them­
selves around the notion of a volkstaat. Across most of the spectrum of far 
right discourses, apartheid is not regarded as the saviour-ideology of the 
Afrikaner. Rather, it is seen as that which ruined their case for a territorially 
sovereign state. It is argued that while much has been written on »the effects of 
apartheid on Africans, Coloureds and Indians, on the ecology, white rhino 
(sz'c!) and whatever else«, no study has been done of the effects of apartheid on 
the Afrikanervolk (Bruwer, 1992).8
Apartheid, here reduced to an ideology which entrenched white privilege on a 
racial basis, is regarded as »the opium of the masses« in that it created a false 
illusion that the Afrikaner had a »land of its own« (Bruwer, 1992), blinding 
them to the »blackening« (verswarting en verbruining) of »white South Af­
rica«. In fact, apartheid's legacy for the »Afrikaner people« is that it left them 
in the position of »a people without a country«, a homeless people. Moreover, 
by conflating the retention of political power and the uplifting of the volk, 
apartheid created a nation of servile civil servants, particularly vulnerable to 
any change in regime. It stripped the Afrikanervolk from its territorial basis 
and work ethic, leading to moral and territorial decay.9 Already from this, it is 
clear that the contemporary right cannot be seen as a simple continuation of the 
extreme, dogmatic forms of Afrikaner nationalism. However difficult to swal­
low politically, it must be emphasized that there is a certain distancing from 
apartheid which makes it untenable to conflate it with earlier forms of rightwing 
ideology. Simply to regard the right as a spent force, built on outdated and
person pronounce the Afrikaans word »jakkals« on its »standard« pronunciation (»jakkals« ) 
then s/he clearly is a member o f the volk. Should it be pronounced »djakkals« instead, such a 
person is excluded from membership. This racist »test« is clearly designed to exclude Coloured 
Afrikaners from the volk, and is reminiscent o f the various tests employed in the early apartheid 
years to establish a person's »race« .
8 The series enumerated here reads like the one Borges alledgedly took from a Chinese 
disctionary. Its principle o f intelligibility is well-nigh unintelligible to us.
9 Here one already sees the »moralism« o f  the far right emerging. It has to be stressed that it, in 
this case, is also coupled with a clear anti-semitic thrust.
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discredited ideological structures would be a mistake, both in theoretical and 
political terms, for the rearticulation effected in their discourse may have far- 
reaching and unforeseen resonances in a changed international context.
This brings us to the signifying force which the post-1989 world has in the 
discourse of the volkstaat ideologues. The most sophisticated version of this 
articulation is to be found in the analysis of the Freedom Front, also making it 
a »milder« version of the argument, compared for example to the position of 
the Afrikaner Volksfront. Distinguishing between the illegitimate racial basis 
of apartheid, and legitimate ethnic forms of identification in our contemporary 
world, it is argued by Come Mulder -  constitutional expert of the Freedom 
Front -  that South Africa's problems are not unique.10 As in the rest of Africa, 
colonial boundaries created artificial entities; in the case of South Africa, the 
non-existent »South Africans«.11 Flaving left the uhuru phase behind, Africa is 
now in a »democratising« phase. For Mulder, what is important to remember 
in this context is that emerging demands for »ethnically« based democracies 
cannot be separated from the increasing globalisation of the world economy. 
Economic interdependence is coupled everywhere with demands for territorial 
separatism. Here once again, the current ideologists of the right are distancing 
themselves from the tradition of Afrikaner separatism, as it was, for example, 
found in the early SABRA demands for »total apartheid«, which meant apart­
heid both in the political and economic spheres.12
Such demands for a sovereign Afrikaner territory can be pursued in two ways: 
via conflict or via constitutional settlement. Referring to the recently won 
»selfgoveming status« of Palestine, the Freedom Front holds that their struggle 
today, far from being anachronistic, is wholly in step with developments in our 
contemporary world. While Palestine acts as positive referent here (and it is 
interesting to note here that Palestine has replaced the role given to Israel by 
apartheid ideologues), the former Yugoslavia serves as the negative pole. This 
is especially the case for the Afrikaner Volksfront who holds that they are 
simply biding their time. On this reading, the theory and practice of non­
racialism will fail in South Africa -  witness Inkatha -  and the far-right will be 
ready to step in at the point in which the conflict in South Africa reach Bosnian
10 Contrast this with the ad nauseam argument by apartheid ideologues on the uniqueness o f  the 
South African situation!
11 The debate on the existence or not o f »South Africans« is a long one. 1 have discussed this in 
a historical context in Norval (1994c).
12 During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the issue o f  »total« versus »partial« apartheid was a key 
debating point in Afrikaner nationalist circles. The concern primarily was whether apartheid 
should be enforced only on the political terrain, or whether it also had to be brought about in 
the economy. Elements within SABRA (Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse Aangeleenthede) 
came out in favour o f »total« apartheid, as the only »moral« form which apartheid could take.
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proportions.13 In keeping with the rest of the world, South Africa is bound to 
travel the road to inevitable disintegration into ethnic territories.
In contrast to the Afrikaner Volksfront, the Freedom Front is, for the moment, 
intent on pursuing the constitutional path to the achievement of its goals.14 In 
this respect it is important to note that they are already working on what is 
called the »internationalisation of the Afrikaner question«, and have embarked 
upon a programme of establishing contacts with senior members of the United 
Nations (Boutros-Boutros Ghali), of the Commonwealth, and the Organisation 
for African unity in order to create the climate in which the 54th independent 
state in Africa may be created via constitutional means. Shortly before the 
election, General Constand Viljoen negotiated a deal to the effect that the issue 
of self-determination be written into the constitution. The 34th (34.1) constitu­
tional principle entails that the right o f  the South African people as a whole to 
self-determination, shall not be construed as precluding, within the fram ew ork  
o f  sa id  right, constitutional provision fo r  a notion o f  the right to self-determi­
nation by any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, 
whether in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other recognised  
way.
This concession is described by the Freedom Front as »wrenching open a door 
for the continuation of ethnic politics in Sout Africa« (Vryheidsfront, »Beginsel 
34 en die Volkstaatraad«, 1994). Article 34 further states that self-determina­
tion may be established should there be substantial support from within the 
particular community for such a form of self-determination.15
This, of course, immediately raises the vexed question as to who the members 
of such an »Afrikaner volk« may be? While members of the Afrikaner
13 The Afrikaner Volksfront seem to hold an apocalytic belief in the eventual failure o f the 
discourse o f  non-racialism. In this sense, their »strategy« is simply to bide their time, and to 
continue to foster alliances with forces which may, under such circumstances, act as allies in 
the search for territorial autonomy on »ethnic« grounds (Aucamp, 1994).
14 It is a well-known fact that the Freedom Front can muster considerable military and para­
military force behind them. These forces, in contrast to those of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweing 
(AWB) who were responsible for the battle for Boputhatswana, are highly trained and 
disciplined. For the moment, however, they remain loyal to General Constand Viljoen and the 
strategy o f constitutional negotiation.
15 The question o f  how this support is to be tested is a vexed one. During the election it was 
suggested that the share o f  the regional vote gained by the Freedom Front would act as a fair 
indicator o f  their support. Regionally this vote ranged from 6% in the Freestate and Northern 
Cape to 0,5% in Natal. However, the more serious issue concerns the determination o f  those 
eligible to participate in the decision for/against a volkstaat since a considerable proportion of 
»Afrikaners« would under no circumstances associate themselves with the »Afrikanervo/teaa?« 
and the Freedom Front.
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Volksfront (and presumably also other far right organisations affiliated to 
them) are quite clear about the need for a racial component to this identity, the 
Freedom Front is less forthcoming on this point. They insist on the fact that the 
Vryheidsfront is a »non-racial« organisation (simply not taking »race« as a 
criterion of qualification) and that it therefore is quite at home in contemporary 
South Africa (Mulder 1994). However, when pushed on the issue, they argue 
that the »volk« will have to decide the issue of membership, leaving the door 
open to racial politics.16 This suspicion is further reinforced by the emphasis in 
their discourse on »nonartificial«, that is »organic«, forms of ethnicity and 
community (Mulder 1994), as well as in their open denial of full citizenship 
rights to »others« who may find themselves within the boundaries of such a 
volkstaat}1
Situated then in the double context of the failure of apartheid and the emer­
gence of ethno-nationalism in our contemporary world, the far right continues 
the tradition of identitary politics found in its most extreme form in apartheid. 
It remains to be seem whether their strategy of distancing themselves from 
apartheid will succeed. For our purposes, however, it is important to stress the 
ever-present dimension of closure and exclusivity articulated in this discourse. 
A discourse in which identity can be seen to pretend to be fully at home with 
itself, coinciding with itself, externalising all difference into otherness which, 
quite literally, has to be externalized beyond the borders of the volkstaat.
Tensional openings
Exactly how out of step this discourse is with the instituted myth now animat­
ing the discourse of a new South African identity becomes clear when it is 
contrasted to the discourse of non-racialism. Non-racialism, of course, has an
16 Here, o f course, it is clear that the real issue concerns the position o f  Afrikaans-speaking 
Coloureds. The Freedom Front, in line with is distancing o f  itself from the racialism of 
apartheid, have great difficulty in dealing with this question. They seem to want to have it both 
ways: an ethnic »Afrikaner« community which nevertheless does not include Coloureds. Thus, 
the strategy ofnot making pronouncements on their stand on the »race« -issue, leaving it to the 
»members« of the volk to decide. It is, moreover, interesting to note that »democracy« does not 
feature prominently in their discurse, if  at all. However, legitimacy as to the »membership« o f 
the group is to be bestowed by »democratic« decision-making procedures -  as i f  that would 
make the result any more palatable!
17 Further problems arise from the very idea o f  a volkstaat, should one take seriously their 
principles as stated in their »Core Manifesto«. Whilst maintaining that the volkstaat should 
exist within a broader non-racial South Africa, no concessions are to be made as to the 
inalienable and »fundamental right o f the Afrikanervolk... to self-determination«, including the 
right »to govern themselves in their own state«. This immediately raises the issue o f  the extent 
o f the limitation o f the rights o f »others« /»non-volk residents« in such a state.
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illustrious and venerable history in South Africa, informing generations strug­
gling against apartheid, and is perhaps captured best in Mandela's oft-quoted 
words spoken during his 1964 trial:
»I have fought against white domination and I  have fought against black 
domination. 1 have cherished the ideal o f a democratic and free society in 
which all people live together in harmony and with equal opportunities.« 
(1990:217)
It is a theme which has continued to structure and inform the voice of the 
African National Congress, becoming more and more infused with a discourse 
on national reconciliation during the 1990s and which reached its most elo­
quent expression in the Presidential inaugural address of the 10 May 1994:
»Out o f the experience o f an extraordinary human disaster that has lasted too, 
too long, must be born a society o f which all humanity will be proud... The time 
fo r  the healing o f wounds has come... We have, at last, achieved our political 
emancipation. We pledge to liberate all our people from the continuing bond­
age o f  poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender and other discrimination... We 
enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South 
Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in 
their hearts... -  a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world... Never, 
never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will ever again 
experience the oppression o f one by another...« (Mandela, inauguration speech,
10 May 1994, reproduced in The Star, 11 May 1994)
Or as a more irreverent commentator put it: »Miracle-man Mandela« is now 
president of all South Africans: »the bald-headed and the bearded, housewife 
and servant, capitalist and unemployed, archbishop and squatter... white and 
black... (Breytenbach, 1994, my translation). However one puts it, in Mandela's 
words is contained a vision which is constitutive of the new imaginary which 
will shape the identities of generations to come, a vision of a »rainbow 
nation«, one nation constituted of many cultures. While this may hold up a 
positive vision of a new »nationhood« or South African identity, much de­
pends on exactly how the relation of identification is understood and is given 
concrete expression.18
As I have argued elsewhere, if it is simply a matter of a recognition of the 
plurality of the South African population, it is possible that the discourse of 
non-racialism may reproduce identitary logics.19 On this reading, the bringing
18 Much depends here on the concrete expression given to non-racialism and the extent to which 
it will, o f necessity, be limited with respect to the application of »affrimative action« 
programmes. For a fuller discussion, see Norval (1994a and 1994c).
19 This possibility has been discussed in greater depth in Norval (1993a).
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together of the African, white, coloured and Indian groups, presumes the 
existence of differential and homogenous communities. While the need for a 
discourse on unity clearly is urgent in the current South African context, the 
question at stake here is exactly how that may be thought. If non-racialism is 
understood on the model of a unification of pre-existing homogenous commu­
nities, then several problems may arise in terms of the institution of a demo­
cratic form. The most important of these would be precisely the tendency to 
treat differential communities as internally homogenous, thus obliterating 
more complex forms of identification which may arise. In its turn, this may 
lead to difficulties in constructing a South African identity, for if  positive 
identification is attributed to the level of the group, it is difficult to see how an 
»overarching« identity will be construed, an identity which will of necessity 
make competing claims to identifcation.
Quite the reverse may of course also take place. The fact that so much 
emphasis is placed on »reconciliation« and »nationbuilding« may very well 
lead to stiffling discourses on the »unity« of the nation. However, it is my 
contention that the tension inherent in the discourse of non-racialism with its 
simultaneous recognition and subversion of a certain category of »race« will 
make this very unlikely. This brings me to another possible reading of the 
discourse of non-racialism, namely one which has as a project the articulation 
of a terrain of a tension. This can be understood most clearly if one focusses on 
the problematisation and weakening of discourses of »racialism« inherent in 
non-racialism. In positing it as a question, thus not attempting to suppress the 
problematics of race -  as has been the case so often in »progressive« politics -  
it subverts all naturalising discourses on race. In addition, the form of identifi­
cation which is to be characteristic of South African identity, does not function 
at the level of a positive specification of a set of elements. Rather, it tends to 
emphasise the negative. Put differently, »South African« identity is given 
precisely in the problematisation of the racial as an ordering principle.
Here I would like to focus for a moment on the question of a negatively 
constituted identity. This would entail that no positively specified set of 
elements in principle can exhaust the content of an identity. In fact, one may 
put it even stronger and argue that such a form of identification recognises the 
fact that an identity can only be formed in the process of differentiating itself 
from something else. The essence of an identity is thus not given in positive 
characteristics, but in and through the moment of exclusion, in what it 
externalises as other. In the case of non-racialism, the role of the other is taken 
by naturalising discourses on race, of which apartheid is the exemplary case. 
Non-racialism thus articulates itself in this field of denial of the other; it 
recognises the absence of a natural community of identity, and consequently
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the need to construct a community as a project.20 This project animates an 
identity never quite at home with itself.
Inherent in this discourse is thus the possibility of coming to terms with the 
contingency and fluidity of forms of identification, of taking the non-closure 
of identity seriously. This, of course, takes us directly back to our earlier 
remarks on the form of the subject appropriate to the democratic form. Follow­
ing Žižek, I have argued that the subject of democracy has to be a non- 
substantial subject. However, before proceeding any further, a number of 
further specifications, not made by Žižek, have to be added. The problem of 
remaining at the level of addressing the question of a democratic subjectivity 
at the level of the »empty subject«, is the following. The lack inherent in all 
identities inauguarates the general need for identification. But, and this cannot 
be over-emphasised, there is nothing in the form of lack as such, which in and 
of itself will lead to a »democratic« form of identification. To put it differently, 
nothing can be read off from the subject of lack.
What then is one to make of my remarks concerning the discourse of non­
racialism and its »negative«, non-substantial form? Here the notion of non­
racialism which has been articulated in the South African context has to be 
fleshed out in greater detail. Two remarks in terms of its relation to a discourse 
on democracy are particularly pertinent here. The first is that this signifier 
acted as a nodal point in the discourses of resistance, »stitching« together 
many other signifiers, of which the demand for democracy, was one of the 
most central ones. The discourse of non-racialism thus acted as a signifier 
designating a whole series of demands. But secondly, and more to the point 
here, is the fact that the discourse of non-racialism, though it is a negatively 
formulated discourse, is nevertheless »smeared« with a certain particularity. 
That is to say, it is not simply a discourse emptied of all concreteness. It 
articulates itself precisely in a context. It is marked by this context. It cannot be 
absolutely abstracted from this context. And it is this »stain«, the fact of its 
non-total emptiness that allows in the final instance for its articulation to a 
democratic project. While holding off essentialist and identitarian conceptions 
of identity with its emphasis on the negatory character of non-racialism, it 
nevertheless contains a certain contextual particulatity which gives a demo­
cratic content to forms of identification. It opens and delineates a certain space 
of identification, and the combination of these two elements -  the holding 
open of a space of identification in principle on the one hand, and the provi-
20 This may amount to an overestimation o f the extent to which the African National Congress 
in fact views this community. Some would argue that it rests on a »given« and »common 
humanity« basis.
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sional filling of that space on the other -  is what characterises the democratic 
space, what makes of identity always to an extent an identité à venir. That is, 
the realisation of the impossibility of ever fully occupying the space of power.
Spectral desires
At this point it is necessary to return to the wider context in which this 
imaginary has been instituted. The events sparked off by the unbanning of the 
African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and other 
proscribed organisations in February 1990, also played an important role in the 
imaginary of the West in the post-1989 context. South Africa has become a 
signifier of hope in an international political landscape which increasingly is 
tom apart by ethno-nationalist struggles. Against such violent and aggressive 
particularisms, the formation of a new South Africa, a country for »all its 
people's« stand as a reminder of the power of the universalism or »anti­
humanist humanism« of discourses of democracy. In this sense, the new South 
Africa acts out what is lacking in the »post-historical« West itself: a sense of 
optimism, engagement and hope. This investment by the spectating West, 
however, is not without its difficulties, for it could involve a refusal to come to 
terms with some of the problems which may be created by an unabashed 
universalism in the South African context.21 Moreover, the colonial legacy has 
to make one somewhat suspicious of the »good intentions« of the other.
This problem can be discussed, metaphorically, through the imminent re-tum 
to South Africa of the collection of artworks »contre/against apartheid«.22 
This collection of works took the form of a traveling exhibition to be presented 
as a gift to the first democratically elected government of South Africa.
»But it is also that God who, in the action o f his anger ... annuls the gift o f  
tongues, or at least embroils it, sows confusion among his sons, and poison the 
present. « (Gift-gift) (Derrida 1991:246)
As is well known in the wake of Derrida's writings on the subject, the structure 
of the gift is a dual one: indicating both a giving without demand and the 
possibility of a poison (Derrida 1985:246). What is at stake here then are the 
various dimensions and implications of this gift to the new South Africa: the 
gift as recognition of the accomplishments of generations struggling for a 
democratic settlement in the country which has become the signifier of oppres­
sion in the international world; the gift coming home, to its original place; the
21 See Norval (1993b).
22 This moving exhibition came to »academic« public knowledge with the publication in Critical 
Inquiry o f  Derrida's piece originally written for the catalogue accompanying the exhibition.
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effects of this homecoming, of the coming to rest of a moving, fluid exhibition; 
the gift poisoning the present...
We can only touch upon some of these dimensions. For our present purposes, 
it is perhaps the most important to concentrate upon what is given in the gift of 
the »contre/against apartheid« exhibition. To do this, one has to clarify what 
this exhibition signified in the first place. It had to serve as a reminder in the 
world at large of the presence of the heinous crime of apartheid. Lest we 
forget.23 In addition, it also had to serve as a signifier of hope. The exhibition 
would travel the cities of the world until such time as it could return home to 
take its rightful place in a democratic South Africa. That time is now. But, a 
question remains. This question concerns the homecoming of the exhibition. 
What could it possibly mean for an exhibition to come home to a place where 
it never was at home, to a place which never was its native land, to take up its 
birthright, its residency in a dwellingplace foreign to it? Moreover, could an 
exhibition, born to dwell restlessly, come home, come to rest? Would that 
signify its »full realization«?
Different possibilities are opened up here. One would certainly be to argue that 
this exhibition, insofar as it signifies an abhorrence with the thing itself, with 
racism as such, and insofar as it therefore carries a signficance far wider than 
the historically existent state of apartheid, should never come to rest. Not in 
South Africa. Not anywhere. Lest we forget. It should continue to circulate in 
the capitals of the world. Especially now, when we are faced with the full 
horrors of an explosion of ethno-nationalisms and fundamentalisms in a post­
cold war world.
Another possibility would be to argue that it should come to South Africa, for 
South Africa now is the place where it belongs. But to repeat the questions 
raised earlier: how can something whose very nature was conceived as being 
in movement, come to belong anywhere? Would it not be better to leave it as a 
signifier of racism in general? Again, various possible modes of thinking 
»belonging« are possible. The most common-sensical and most dangerous 
(poisonous) would be simply to argue that since apartheid has come to an end, 
has been superceded once and for all, that the rightful place of the exhibition is 
inside the geographical boundaries of the new South Africa. Such a rendering 
of »belonging« would, to my mind, be completely out of touch and against the 
ethos of the exhibition; it would force it to rest, force it into a definitive mould. 
Moreover, such a definition, a location, a placement would signify politically 
that it is possible to end completely, to create an absolute and unequivocal
231 treated the complicated question o f  the role o f the memory o f apartheid today in Norval 
(1994a).
42 Aletta J. Norval
break with the past. It is precisely that which has to be problematised, for such 
a rendering would simply reinforce identitary logics once again.
Deferred homecomings
What then are the alternatives? Another way of conceiving of the exhibition 
would be neither to deny its legitimate place in South Africa, nor to confine it 
to that geographical and signitive space, but combining its specific and univer­
sal value, its necessary content and that which escapes all content. Indeed, one 
could think it along the lines of a never-ending movement, or space of 
identification proper to the democratic space and its articulation in the dis­
course of non-racialism. That is, the exhibition »contre/against apartheid« 
could be argued to have the character of the negative attributed to non­
racialism earlier. In that case, a break with apartheid will not be able to 
function as an absolute one, not yet, in any case. Apartheid, for the time being, 
will remain its other. It will keep open the democratic space. Its homecoming 
will always be a radically delayed one. A deferred homecoming. A coming 
home which never quite reaches home. The tension characteristic of the 
democratic space will be replicated there. In conclusion: if it could find its 
home, once and for all, if the gap between identity and identification could be 
closed, »society would have found its final form and democratic interaction 
would be impossible. It is because the gap cannot be filled that society can be 
constructed as that political management of its own impossibility that we call 
democracy« (Laclau 1994:12).
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